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a b s t r a c t
When individuals can inﬂuence their life-expectancies and save in annuities, suboptimal
savings result from the lack of incentives to choose the optimal longevity, even when annu-
ity returns can be made contingent to longevity-related choices. Speciﬁcally, the golden
rule steady state maximizing the representative agent utility cannot be attained as a com-
petitive equilibrium under laissez-faire, even with actuarially fair annuities contingent to
longevity-enhancing choices. In order to decentralize through markets the golden rule,
longevity-enhancing expenditures need to be taxed if the steady state old-age consump-
tion exceeds the annuitized capital return, and subsidized otherwise—the government
budget being balanced through lump-sum transfers or taxes. Interestingly, with positive
population growth the expected net contribution is negative when longevity-enhancing
expenditures are taxed, and positive when subsidized.
 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Individuals decide not only what and when to consume (given their resources and the available ﬁnancial contracts), but
also about how long to expect to live. Indeed, individuals do inﬂuence their life expectancy in various ways by undertaking or
avoiding actions and behaviors that may increase or decrease it.1 Off course, increasing one’s life expectancy can typically be
done only at a cost, either in terms of resources (e.g. healthcare undertaken at the expense of lost consumption), or in terms of
disutility (e.g. forgone unhealthy pleasures or a constraining way of life).2 If that was it, the problemwould not be different from
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2015.06.002
0164-0704/ 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
q The authors want to thank the journal editor for very insightful comments on the submitted manuscript, as well as Jacques Drèze, David de la Croix,
Wilfried Koch, Pierre Pestieau and Grégory Ponthière on a previous version of the paper. Julio Dávila gratefully thanks funding from the research grant no.
F.6007.09 from the Belgian FNRS as ‘‘Promoteur d’un M.I.S. – Mobilité Ulysse F.R.S.-FNRS’’.
⇑ Corresponding author.
1 For instance, agents can affect they life expectancy through their choice of preventive and palliative medical care, diet, lifestyle (see Balia and Jones, 2008).
Poikolainen and Escola (1986) study in particular the impact of health expenditures on life expectancy. Several other studies document the impact of physical
activity (Kaplan et al., 1987; Okamoto, 2006), overweight (see Solomon and Manson, 1997; Bender et al., 1998) and smoking (Doll and Hill, 1950) on life
expectancy.
2 While the most obvious way to increase life expectancy is to increase medical treatment, which requires the actual spending of income, individuals can also
make behavioral choices to that end (e.g. exercising, abstaining from smoking, eating a healthy diet, driving safely) that do not necessarily require an additional
spending, but may inﬂict nonetheless some disutility.
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any other implying a trade-off between competing goals, namely between quantity and quality of life here. Nevertheless, things
are in this case (unsurprisingly) more complicated: our choice of an expected life-span is intermingled with the problem of how
to deal with the risk of outliving our resources. In effect, for most people, most consumption is ﬁnanced out of labor income,
which stops at retirement for legal reasons, or earlier for physiological ones, so that the most straightforward way to guarantee
an income at retirement is to save. Still, individual savings do not eliminate this risk entirely, since miscalculation may lead to
either running short of savings before dying or to leaving accidental bequests.3
To address in particular the risk of individuals saving insufﬁciently for old age, mandatory pension schemes force the
inter- and intra-generational transfers necessary to guarantee adequate old-age living standards. Moreover, these manda-
tory public pension schemes are increasingly supplemented by private market-based schemes, such as annuities provid-
ing a life-long income after retirement in exchange of previous contributions. Nevertheless, once insured against the risk
of running out of income, anyone has obvious incentives to take measures to increase his or her life-expectancy.4
Mandatory public pension schemes in which the pension received is not contingent to the individuals’ life-enhancing
choices are clearly unable to deal with this incentives problem, and are likely to induce excessive longevity, compared
to the optimal one. Indeed, annuities that are independent of the individuals’ choices make them invest in the quantity
of life without internalizing the subsequent negative impact on its quality (through lower annuity returns). Instead, private
annuity markets should have more chances of solving this incentives problem, by being able to make returns contingent to
observable individual choices and behavior.5 This conjecture is precisely what this paper explores. To do so, we use a
Diamond (1965) overlapping-generations economy of agents living up to two periods in which longevity—i.e. the probabil-
ity of survival into the second period—is assumed to be endogenous (in Section 6, we extend the analysis to an
overlapping-generations model akin to a ‘‘perpetual youth’’ model à la Blanchard (1985) without constant survival proba-
bility: households can live any number of periods, but face at any time a probability of survival into the next period that
depends on their longevity-enhancing expenditures).
Speciﬁcally, can perfect annuity markets—which can price longevity-enhancing observable behavior into annuity
returns—overcome alone the problem of inefﬁcient investment in longevity? We show here, ﬁrst, that in a laissez-faire,
dynamic setup the answer to this question is negative. More speciﬁcally, we establish that typically the golden rule steady
state maximizing the expected utility of the representative agent is not an equilibrium outcome under laissez-faire, even
with actuarially fair, longevity-contingent competitive annuity markets. Moreover, in order to lay bare the fact that longevity
choices are the root of the problem, we show that for an exogenous survival probability the golden rule is attainable through
annuities and money. We show next that, in this set-up, life-expectancy is actually not necessarily higher at the competitive
equilibrium steady state than at the golden rule: there may as well be, at equilibrium, a problem of under-investment in
longevity as one of over-investment. In other words, depending on their preferences, the agents may uncoordinatedly choose
to live shorter and richer lives, as well as longer and poorer lives, than the optimal lives the resources allow for if they coor-
dinated their choices. Finally, we identify a policy of taxes and transfers that decentralizes the golden rule as a competitive
outcome.
This paper is related to the literature on endogenous longevity in overlapping generations setups. In Chakraborty (2004)
and De la Croix and Ponthière (2010) survival chances are a function of a constant fraction of, respectively, the marginal pro-
ductivity of labor and the output per worker. Chakraborty (2004) argue for the positive impact on growth of publicly funded
health care through the subsequent increase in the returns to investment in human capital, while De la Croix and Ponthière
(2010) study how the golden rule is modiﬁed when longevity depends on per capita income. At any rate, longevity is not in
these two papers the result of any deliberate choice by the agents of setting aside resources devoted speciﬁcally to modify
it.6 To the contrary, in our paper, longevity is actually a direct private choice as it depends on the agent’s private healthcare
expenditures, like in Pestieau et al. (2008) and Jouvet et al. (2010).7 Nevertheless, Jouvet et al. (2010) explicitly avoid addressing
any risk aspect of the problem assuming deterministic life-spans that are function of health expenditures, while Pestieau et al.
(2008) restrict the analysis to the case in which there exists a pay-as-you-go pension systemwith an exogenously given replace-
ment ratio of beneﬁts to wages.
The papers above focus on either the competitive equilibrium steady state, as in Chakraborty (2004), or on the golden
rule steady state, as in De la Croix and Ponthière (2010), or on the solution of a planner constrained by an exogenously
given replacement ratio of an existing pay-as-you-go pension scheme, as in Jouvet et al. (2010). We show here instead
that the golden rule cannot typically be attained under laissez-faire as a competitive equilibrium with annuitized savings
when the agents can inﬂuence their longevity, even if the annuities contracts are devised to cope with the incentives to
over-invest in longevity when insured. Notwithstanding, we show that an active ﬁscal policy allows to implement the
golden rule as an equilibrium outcome. Speciﬁcally, whether longevity-enhancing expenditures need to be taxed or
3 Another primitive way to address this risk is to have children, although it is clearly not entirely free of risk either, in spite of the premeditate attempts by
most cultures to instil in children devotion towards their parents.
4 This point was developed in Davies and Kuhn (1992) and Philipson and Becker (1998).
5 Philipson and Becker (1998) note that this externality can also arise with private annuity markets, if it is too costly to control longevity-enhancing behavior
through insurance premia. Yet, the authors argue that public schemes are more subject to this moral-hazard problem, given their lack of a proﬁt-maximization
motive.
6 It is indirectly a consequence of their saving decisions, but for that reason the agents cannot disentangle the two choices.
7 Jouvet et al. (2010) also study the impact of a production externality (such as pollution) on longevity.
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subsidized in order to implement the golden rule turns out to depend on whether the golden rule consumption of old
agents exceeds the annuitized return to their capital savings or not. The policy is such that the government budget is
balanced every period by period by means of lump-sum transfers to, or taxes from, the old depending on whether they
got their longevity-enhancing expenditures taxed or subsidized respectively. Interestingly enough, and in stark contrast
with the naive intuition that subsidizing longevity-enhancing expenditures (say, health expenditures) is good and taxing
them is bad, it turns out that, whenever there is population growth, the expected net contribution of an agent from tax-
ing them is negative when they need to be taxed to implement the golden rule, while his expected net contribution is
positive when they need to be subsidized.8
This paper can also be related to the vast literature on the annuitization of savings. This branch of the literature has grown
rapidly following the development of annuity markets.9 The seminal contribution of Yaari (1965) assumes exogenous longev-
ity, and shows that the optimal annuity pattern is independent of the individuals mortality proﬁle. On the contrary, Bommier
et al. (2011) study, in a partial equilibrium framework, the optimal taxation of annuities when individuals have different (exoge-
nous) life-expectancies, and shows that optimal taxation differs across individuals (under some assumptions on individuals’
preferences). Some other papers also consider the optimal ﬁscal policy when longevity is endogenous. For instance, in
Leroux et al. (2011), individuals do not perfectly anticipate the consequences of longevity-enhancing efforts on the return of
their annuitized savings—as in Philipson and Becker (1998)—and it shows that a tax on health expenditure is required to imple-
ment the optimum in a partial equilibrium setting. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, it appears that studying the opti-
mal taxation of annuities in a dynamic setup has not been paid much attention until now.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and show that with exogenous survival probability,
annuities and money sufﬁce to reach the golden rule. In Sections 3 and 4, we derive respectively the laissez-faire competitive
equilibrium with actuarially fair annuities contingent to longevity choices as well as the golden rule steady state, and thus
show that the latter fails to be an equilibrium outcome. In Section 5, we show how to decentralize the golden rule as a com-
petitive equilibrium steady state. In Section 6, we discuss alternative assumptions regarding longevity. First, we show how
our previous results are modiﬁed when longevity-enhancing behavior is costly in terms of utility rather than in terms of for-
gone consumption. Second, we extend the model to consider endogenous second-period labor supply which depends on the
health expenditures made in the ﬁrst period, and we show that all main results hold up. Third, we show that our results
remain true when households live any number of periods with a positive survival probability, as long as
longevity-enhancing expenditures are positive too. The last section concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Assumptions
At every date t, a continuum of identical agents are born. The representative agent born at t lives at least one period but at
most two, conditional on survival with a probability pðetÞ that he can inﬂuence through et , a fraction of ﬁrst-period income
devoted to health expenditures.
The survival probability pðÞ is assumed to satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1.
p0ðetÞ > 0
p00ðetÞ < 0
lim
et!0þ
p0ðetÞ ¼ þ1
ð1Þ
Hence, the higher the longevity-enhancing expenditures et , the higher is the survival probability, but also the smaller is the
increase in life-expectancy due to one additional unit of such expenditures. Longevity-enhancing expenditures are assumed to
be observable and veriﬁable, so that they can be contracted upon.10 Note that the probability of survival pðetÞ is also the propor-
tion of individuals born at t and choosing et that is expected to survive into the next period. For large enough cohorts of agents
choosing an effort level et , the actual survival rate will be arbitrarily close to pðetÞ, according to the law of large numbers.
At the end of the ﬁrst period—i.e. before the mortality shock realizes—each agent gives birth to n children, so that the size
of each cohort of young agents is n times that of the previous one.
8 At any rate, the golden rule gets implemented in both cases (and which of them realizes depends on the characteristics of the economy: preferences,
technology, etc.), so that agents are not ex ante worse-off with a positive net contribution than with a negative one. The result highlights the importance of
looking at the whole (general equilibrium) picture of consequences of taxes and transfers to assess a policy, instead of focusing on what gets directly taxed or
subsidized.
9 For a good review of the issues raised by the annuitization of savings, see Sheshinski (2007).
10 Assuming imperfect observability would only add an additional source of inefﬁciency, on top of the one on which this paper focuses, namely the
impossibility for the agents to internalize the effects of their longevity choices on their savings returns. Also, since we consider a representative agent, these
expenditures, if not directly observable, could anyway be deduced from the individual’s problem.
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When young, the representative agent supplies inelastically one unit of labor for a real wage rate wt that he splits
between ﬁrst-period consumption ct0, longevity-enhancing expenditures e
t , and savings.11
Saved income can be held in money or invested in annuities from competitive pension funds lending the contributions to
the ﬁrms producing output. The returns to the investments in the pension funds are supposed to be made contractually con-
tingent to the observable longevity-enhancing expenditures. Therefore, for actuarially fair annuities, whenever the represen-
tative agent makes a longevity effort et , the return to these annuities is the marginal productivity of capital over the
corresponding survival rate, rtþ1=pðetÞ. As for the money savings,12 note ﬁrst thatmoney stands here for an asset bubble whose
returns cannot be contractually annuitized—not to mention made contingent to longevity-related choices—as it is indeed the
case for cash holdings or bank account balances. Then the question of what happens to money savings of the deceased naturally
arises. As a matter of fact, whether they are assumed to vanish as claims with their owners or taxed away and redistributed
among survivors makes no difference to the equilibrium allocation. Only the rate at which prices decrease as population grows
would change, depending on whether the amount of money remains constant or shrinks as the monetary savings of the
deceased are redistributed or vanish respectively. Accordingly, for the sake of notational simplicity, we will write all expressions
below as if the claims supported by money savings of the deceased vanished with them.13
Denoting ct0 and c
t
1 the ﬁrst- and second-period consumptions of an agent born at time t, his problem consists therefore in
maximizing the following expected utility
uðct0Þ þ pðetÞvðct1Þ ð2Þ
under the budget constraints14
ct0 þ kt þ
1
pt
Mt þ et 6 wt
ct1 6
1
pðetÞ rtþ1k
t þ 1
ptþ1
Mt
ð3Þ
where Mt represent savings held in money, kt , the savings held in annuities, wt the real wage rate, and pt prices, at time t.
According to the second-period budget constraint above, the agent knows that the annuity contract makes its return,
rtþ1=pðetÞ, depend on his choice of observable longevity-enhancing expenditures.
Per period utility functions u and v are twice continuously differentiable, increasing, strictly concave functions satisfying
the Inada condition, i.e. such that
Assumption 2.
u0ðc0Þ > 0 < v 0ðc1Þ
u00ðc0Þ < 0 > v 00ðc1Þ
lim
c0!0þ
u0ðc0Þ ¼ þ1 ¼ lim
c1!0þ
v 0ðc1Þ
ð4Þ
Finally, in order to guarantee the quasi-concavity of the representative agent’s utility, as well as that the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions are not only necessary but also sufﬁcient to characterize the agents’ optimal choices, we also make throughout the
paper the following assumption:
Assumption 3.
pðeÞp00ðeÞvðc1Þv 00ðc1ÞP p0ðeÞv 0ðc1Þð Þ2 ð5Þ
The above condition can as well be expressed (if v is assumed to take strictly positive values) as follows
11 A longer life, especially a healthier one, is also likely to increase the labor force available for production at any time but, since in this model only young
agents work and supply inelastically one unit of labor, an increased life expectancy has no impact on the labor supply. In Section 6.2, we extend our framework
allowing for second-period labor supply to depend on the health expenditure made in the ﬁrst period. We show that this does not change qualitatively the
message of the paper and we are still able to identify the inefﬁciency created by the inability of agents to internalize the impact on saving returns of
endogenous longevity.
12 As in Diamond (1965), there is no hope that the golden rule be an equilibrium outcome in the absence of money (except for a knife-edge case). In Diamond
(1965) the introduction of money (or national debt) ﬁxes the problem (see Blanchard and Fisher, 1993, Chapter 4). Here, money alone will not be sufﬁcient, but
it will nonetheless be necessary. In effect, should there be no money to save in, but only annuities, then the competitive equilibrium steady state would
necessarily differ from the golden rule but for a degenerate case (see Proposition 3).
13 See Footnotes 14 and 20, as well as Sheshinski (2007) or Diamond (2005) for references. In order to keep the problem separate from intergenerational
redistribution issues, we do not allow here for these claims to be redistributed among the newly born young agents (see Heijdra et al. (2014) for a comparison of
these different options in an exogenous longevity setup).
14 Should the deceased money savings be distributed among survivors the last term in the second period budget constraint would be 1ptþ1
Mt
pðet Þ instead. Note
however that the representative agent would not in this case take into account the impact of his choice of et on this term, since (i) the return to money cannot
be made contingent to longevity-related choices (as opposed to the return to each individual’s annuities, which he duly takes into account when solving (2–3)),
and (ii) the impact of each individual on the survival rate is negligible.
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p00ðeÞ
p0ðeÞ e 
v 00ðc1Þ
v 0ðc1Þ c1 P
p0ðeÞ
pðeÞ e 
v 0ðc1Þ
vðc1Þ c1 ð6Þ
i.e. the product of the elasticities of p0 and v 0 is bigger than the product of the elasticities of p and v. In other words, the
(proportional) marginal increases in survival probability and second-period utility have to be jointly more sensitive to effort
and consumption respectively than the probability and utility themselves, a sort of strong enough concavity of
second-period expected utility.
At every period t, ﬁrms produce, out of aggregate capital Kt ¼ nt1kt1 and labor Lt ¼ nt , an amount FðKt ; LtÞ of good—that
can be consumed (by young and old), saved (to serve as next period’s capital), or devoted to longevity-enhancing expendi-
tures—according to a neoclassical production function satisfying the following standard assumption.15
Assumption 4. The production function FðKt; LtÞ is increasing, concave, has constant returns to scale, and, for all Kt ; Lt P 0,
FðKt ;0Þ ¼ 0 ¼ Fð0; LtÞ
lim
K!0þ
FKðK; LtÞ ¼ þ1 ¼ lim
L!0þ
FLðKt ; LÞ ð7Þ
Factor markets are perfectly competitive, so that at every period t the real wage rate is equal to the marginal productivity
of labor and the marginal productivity of capital remunerates capital loans from the pension funds to ﬁrms,16 i.e.
wt ¼ FL k
t1
n
;1
 !
rtþ1 ¼ FK k
t
n
;1
 ! ð8Þ
Before going further, let us mention that in the main part of the manuscript, we will assume that longevity can only be
increased using up resources. Only in Section 6.1, we relax this assumption to assume instead that longevity can be increased
through efforts that are costly in terms of utility but not in terms of the budget constraint.
2.2. The benchmark with exogenous longevity
In order to lay bare how the agents’ ability to inﬂuence their life expectancy generates the inefﬁciency pointed at in this
paper, let us ﬁrst assume that the survival probability is exogenous so that it does not depend on agents’ health expenditures.
In such a case, pðetÞ then reduces to some constant probability p. As it will become apparent below, in this set up the golden
rule will be reached if the agents can save in fair annuities and money.
The representative agent’s problem is now
max
06ct0 ;c
t
1 ;k
t ;Mt
uðct0Þ þ pvðct1Þ
s:t: ct0 þ kt þ 1pt M
t 6 wt
ct1 6 1p rtþ1k
t þ 1ptþ1 M
t
ð9Þ
givenwt; rtþ1; pt , and ptþ1. The ﬁrst-period budget constraint differs from (3) in that, under exogenous survival, the agent does
not invest in et . The second-period budget constraint is also modiﬁed as the return from the annuity contract is in ﬁxed pro-
portion to the return to capital.
Assumption 2 guarantees that ct0; c
t
1 > 0 as well as strictly positive savings, which implies that either k
t
> 0 or Mt > 0 (or
both, as long as the two assets have the same return). In order to see whether the golden rule can be an equilibrium outcome,
we are nonetheless interested only in a competitive equilibrium steady state such that kt > 0 and Mt > 0 for all t.17
Solving problem (9), the choice of an agent born at time t is a solution to
15 For the sake of notational simplicity, capital is assumed to depreciate completely in one period.
16 Competition among pension funds leads to the complete distribution as annuities of the return to the capital lent to ﬁrms among the proportion pðetÞ of
survivors.
17 Any steady state with either kt ¼ 0 orMt ¼ 0 for all t is Pareto-dominated by an interior competitive equilibrium steady state. This is obvious if kt ¼ 0 for all
t. And if Mt ¼ 0 for all t, any such equilibrium steady state would be characterized by the system (14), except for the ﬁrst line, which would be
u0ð~c0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ ¼ FK
~k
n
;1
 !
so that the marginal productivity of capital is not guaranteed to coincide with the rate of growth of the population, and therefore the net output may not be
maximized, as it is indeed at an interior competitive equilibrium steady state.
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1
p
u0ðct0Þ
v 0ðct1Þ
¼ pt
ptþ1
¼ 1
p
rtþ1
ct0 þ kt þ
1
pt
Mt ¼ wt
ct1 ¼
1
p
rtþ1k
t þ 1
ptþ1
Mt
ð10Þ
The ﬁrst equation in the ﬁrst line equates the marginal rate of substitution between ﬁrst- and second-period consumptions
to the rate at which income can be transferred from the ﬁrst to the second period of life. It determines thus the agent’s opti-
mal level of savings. The second equation in the ﬁrst line requires the absence of arbitrage between the two saving instru-
ments (money and annuities) for the agent to be willing to hold them both. The second and third lines are the agent’s budget
constraints.
Note that at a competitive equilibrium, the real wage wt and the rental rate of capital rtþ1 are determined by the marginal
productivities of labor and capital respectively as in conditions (8). Also, adding up the budget constraints of the agents alive
at any given period t,
ct0 þ
p
n
ct11 þ kt þ
1
pt
Mt ¼ FL k
t1
n
;1
 !
þ FK k
t1
n
;1
 !
kt1
n
þ p
n
1
pt
Mt1 ð11Þ
it follows that the feasibility of the allocation is equivalent to
Mt
Mtþ1
¼ n
p
ð12Þ
which at the steady state implies also that
pt
ptþ1
¼ n
p
ð13Þ
Hence, the equilibrium return to money increases with the population growth factor but decreases with the survival
chance.
A competitive equilibrium steady state consists, therefore, of a proﬁle ð~c0; ~c1; ~k; ~mÞ satisfying
u0ð~c0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ ¼ n ¼ FK
~k
n
;1
 !
~c0 þ ~kþ ~m ¼ FL
~k
n
;1
 !
p
n
~c1 ¼ FK
~k
n
;1
 !
~k
n
þ ~m:
ð14Þ
We now derive the golden rule steady state that maximizes the utility of the representative agent, under the feasibility
constraint. For an economy with large enough generations, it is characterized by the solution to the following problem
max
06c0 ;c1 ;k
uðc0Þ þ pvðc1Þ
s:t: c0 þ pn c1 þ k 6 F kn ;1
  ð15Þ
The resource constraint in the optimization problem above requires that the output per worker (net of capital replace-
ment) allows at any time to satisfy the consumptions of young and old agents alive that period, the latter being only a pro-
portion 1n of the former because of the population growth, of which, moreover, only a fraction p would have survived, for
large enough cohorts. The golden rule steady state ðc0; c1; kÞ is then a solution to the optimization problem above and hence
necessarily satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-order conditions
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ
¼ n ¼ FK k

n
;1
 
c0 þ
p
n
c1 þ k ¼ F
k
n
;1
  ð16Þ
The ﬁrst line follows on the one hand, from equating the marginal rate of substitution 1p
u0 ðc0Þ
v 0 ðc1Þ
to the rate at which consump-
tion can be transferred between contemporaneous young and old agents np, and, on the other hand, from the condition for net
output maximization which results in equating the marginal productivity of capital to the growth factor of the population.
The second line is the feasibility of the allocation of resources so that output net of capital replacement must equal at any
period the consumption of young and surviving old agents.
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Under the assumptions made, the golden rule is deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order conditions in (16) above and it is unique (see
Proposition A1 in the appendix).
Comparing the systems (14) and (16) characterizing, respectively, the competitive equilibrium steady state and the
golden rule, it is immediate to see that the golden rule solves the competitive equilibrium steady state equations, for some
positive amount of money. Thus, the introduction of an exogenous survival probability does not change the well-known
result in a Diamond (1965) model that a bubble asset—in this case supplemented by annuities—allows to reach the golden
rule as a competitive equilibrium steady state, as the next proposition states.
Proposition 1. Consider a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations production economy with money and an exogenously
growing population with a representative agent facing an exogenous probability of survival, and saving in actuarially fair annuities.
The golden rule is a competitive equilibrium steady state of the economy.
So, as long as the survival probability is exogenous, fair annuities and money allow to reach the golden rule. We will now
show that Proposition 1 does not hold anymore when longevity depends on individual choices, even if the annuity returns
can be made contingent to those choices.
3. Competitive equilibria with endogenous longevity
The representative agent’s problem under perfect competition and endogenous longevity is
max
06ct0 ;c
t
1 ;k
t ;Mt ;et
uðct0Þ þ pðetÞvðct1Þ
s:t: ct0 þ kt þ 1pt M
t þ et 6 wt
ct1 6 1pðetÞ rtþ1k
t þ 1ptþ1 M
t
ð17Þ
given wt ; rtþ1; pt , and ptþ1. Thus, the individual has not only to decide how much to save—as well as how to allocate his sav-
ings between capital and money—but also the amount et of his income to put aside so as to increase his life expectancy, tak-
ing into account its impact on the return of annuities.
Indeed, in the second-period budget constraint, the representative agent is aware that the annuity return contractually
depends on his choice of et , according to the assumption that pension funds can make the individual annuity contract con-
tingent to his longevity-enhancing observable choices. Note also that Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that ct0; c
t
1; e
t > 0 as
well as strictly positive savings, which implies that either kt > 0 or Mt > 0 (or both, as long as the two assets have the same
return). For the same reason as before, we focus nonetheless on the characterization of interior competitive equilibria such
that kt > 0 and Mt > 0 for all t.18 The agent’s choice in such equilibria is then necessarily characterized by the ﬁrst-order con-
ditions19 or, equivalently,
1
pðetÞ
u0ðct0Þ
v 0ðct1Þ
¼ pt
ptþ1
¼ 1
pðetÞ rtþ1
ct0 þ kt þ
1
pt
Mt þ et ¼ wt
ct1 ¼
1
pðetÞ rtþ1k
t þ 1
ptþ1
Mt
p0ðetÞvðct1Þ ¼ 1þ
p0ðetÞ
pðetÞ k
t
 
v 0ðct1Þrtþ1:
ð18Þ
The ﬁrst equality in the ﬁrst line equates the marginal rate of substitution between ﬁrst- and second-period consump-
tions to the rate at which income can be transferred from the ﬁrst to the second period of life. It determines thus the agent’s
optimal level of savings. The second equality in the ﬁrst line requires the absence of arbitrage between the two saving instru-
ments (money and annuities) for the agent to be willing to hold them both. Note that it depends on health expenditures et .
The second and third lines are the agent’s budget constraints. The last equation states that the agent’s optimal level of
longevity-enhancing expenditure et should be such that the marginal gain p0ðetÞvðct1Þ of increasing it equalizes its marginal
cost, which is twofold: the part following from a smaller ﬁrst-period or second-period consumption, u0ðct0Þ ¼ v 0ðct1Þrtþ1, and
the part following from a reduced return from annuitized savings, that is to say pðetÞv 0ðct1Þ p
0 ðet Þ
pðetÞ2 rtþ1k
t .
Using the equilibrium factor prices in (8), we obtain from the addition of the budget constraints of the agents alive at any
given period t,
18 See Footnote 17.
19 The ﬁrst-order conditions are not sufﬁcient (although the objective function is quasi-concave under Assumption 3, the constrained set is not necessarily
convex). Nonetheless, they are still necessary, so that for the purpose of showing that the golden rule is not a market outcome (see Proposition 2) not being a
sufﬁcient condition is not essential.
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ct0 þ
pðet1Þ
n
ct11 þ kt þ
1
pt
Mt þ et ¼ FL k
t1
n
;1
 !
þ FK k
t1
n
;1
 !
kt1
n
þ pðe
t1Þ
n
1
pt
Mt1 ð19Þ
so that the feasibility of the allocation is equivalent to
Mt
Mtþ1
¼ n
pðetÞ ð20Þ
which at the steady state implies also
pt
ptþ1
¼ n
pðeÞ : ð21Þ
The equilibrium return to money now depends, indirectly, on the equilibrium choice of effort.20 The link between effort
and the return to money is however not internalized by the agents: while each agent’s annuities return is contractually contin-
gent to his own individual effort (which he duly takes into account), the return to money is the result of demographics and
hence, depends on the average effort (on which each agent has a negligible impact and, therefore, duly disregards). Of course,
given our representative agent model, average and individual efforts coincide, but they affect differently the agents’ behavior.
A competitive equilibrium steady state consists, therefore, of a proﬁle ð~c0; ~c1; ~e; ~k; ~mÞ satisfying
u0ð~c0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ ¼ n ¼ FK
~k
n
;1
 !
~c0 þ ~kþ ~mþ ~e ¼ FL
~k
n
;1
 !
pð~eÞ
n
~c1 ¼ FK
~k
n
;1
 !
~k
n
þ ~m
p0ð~eÞvð~c1Þ ¼ 1þ p
0ð~eÞ
pð~eÞ
~k
 
v 0ð~c1Þn;
ð22Þ
which we compare to the golden rule steady state in the next sections.
4. The golden rule with endogenous longevity
For an economy with large enough generations the golden rule is characterized by the unique solution to the problem
maximizing the steady state expected utility of the representative agent under the feasibility constraint (written next in
per young terms)21
max
06c0 ;c1 ;k;e
uðc0Þ þ pðeÞvðc1Þ
s:t: c0 þ pðeÞn c1 þ kþ e 6 F kn ;1
  ð23Þ
The resource constraint above differs from the exogenous survival probability case in that we now need to take into
account that longevity can be increased devoting resources to health expenditures e. Accordingly, the fraction of survivors
depends on the investment in longevity-enhancing expenditures.
The solution to the optimization problem above is characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions,22 or equivalently
20 If themonetary savings of the deceasedwere distributed among the survivors, the second period budget constraint faced by the representative agentwould be
ct1 6
rtþ1
pðetÞ k
t þ 1pðetÞ
Mt
ptþ1
which implies at equilibrium (for the allocation of resources to be feasible) that M
t
Mtþ1
¼ n, instead of Mt
Mtþ1
¼ npðet Þ, so that at a competitive equilibrium steady
state prices ptptþ1 should evolve according to n as well, instead of
n
pðet Þ. Nonetheless the competitive equilibrium steady state allocation would still be given by
the system (22), as long as the representative agent is not able to internalize the impact the survival probability on the actual return to money, which is not
n but n=pðeÞ. If he was able to do so, then the competitive equilibrium steady state would implement the golden rule but, as discussed above, he is pre-
vented from doing so by (i) the impossibility to annuitize the returns of money holdings and bank accounts balances (not to mention to make them con-
tingent to longevity-related choices), and (ii) each individual’s negligible impact on the survival rate.
21 The steady state expected utility of the representative agent is the right welfare criterion in this setup. In particular, since population grows each period
exogenously by a factor n (reproduction is not a choice variable for the agents), welfare criteria used in endogenous fertility setups—see Golosov et al. (2007)—
are of no application here.
22 It should be noted that, although the objective function in (23) is nicely quasi-concave under Assumption 3, the constrained set is not necessarily convex, so
that the planner’s problem fails to be convex. Nevertheless, the existence (from the compactness of the constrained set) and interiority (by Assumptions 1 and
2) of the solution to (23) makes possible to characterize it as the only solution (see Proposition A2 in the appendix) to the ﬁrst-order conditions in (24).
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u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ
¼ n ¼ FK k

n
;1
 
c0 þ
pðeÞ
n
c1 þ k þ e ¼ F
k
n
;1
 
p0ðeÞvðc1Þ ¼ 1þ
p0ðeÞ
n
c1
 
v 0ðc1Þn
ð24Þ
The ﬁrst line follows on the one hand, from equating the marginal rate of substitution 1pðeÞ
u0 ðc0Þ
v 0 ðc1Þ
to the rate at which con-
sumption can be transferred between contemporaneous young and old agents npðeÞ, and, on the other hand, from the condi-
tion for the net output maximization which leads to equating the marginal productivity of capital to the growth factor of the
population. The second line is the feasibility of the allocation of resources so that output net of capital replacement must
equal at any period the consumption of the young and of the contemporaneous surviving old agents plus the
longevity-enhancing expenditures. Finally, the third line requires that, at the golden rule, the marginal beneﬁt of increasing
the life-expectancy, p0ðeÞvðc1Þ, exactly matches its marginal cost, which consists of (i) the direct impact that an increase in
health expenditures has on ﬁrst-period consumption or second-period consumption, u0ðc0Þ ¼ v 0ðc1Þn, and (ii) the indirect
cost in terms of the additional pressure put on resources following from bigger cohorts of survivors, p0ðeÞv 0ðc1Þc1.
Note that the last equation in the system (24) differs from the last equation in the competitive system (22): the factor ~kpð~eÞ
within brackets in the competitive equilibrium steady state is now replaced by c

1
n in the golden rule. As a consequence, in the
absence of intervention, no competitive equilibrium steady state solution to Eqs. (22) is the golden rule (except in the
knife-edge case in which the equilibrium demand for money happens to be zero) as established in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations production economy with money and an exogenously
growing population with a representative agent who can increase his survival probability at a real cost and can save in actuarially
fair annuities contractually contingent to such choices. Under laissez-faire, no competitive equilibrium steady state of the economy
with a positive demand for money implements the golden rule steady state.
Proof. There is no need to consider possible non-interior competitive equilibrium steady states, since they are
Pareto-dominated by any (interior) solution to (22) and therefore could not coincide with the golden rule.23 Thus, letting
ð~c0;~c1; ~k; ~m; ~eÞ be a competitive equilibrium steady state solution to (22) and ðc0; c1; k; eÞ be the golden rule—i.e. the solution
to (24)-– it follows trivially from the last equation in each of the systems that, should the two steady states coincide, then
necessarily
1
pð~eÞ
~k ¼ 1
n
~c1 ð25Þ
which from the second-period budget constraint in (22) implies ~m ¼ 0. In other words, no competitive equilibrium steady
state with ~m – 0 implements the golden rule. h
Therefore, in the absence of intervention, the demand for money should be zero for a competitive equilibrium steady state
to implement the golden rule. Nevertheless, typically money holdings will be nonzero at equilibrium, since money is what
allows the agents to disentangle the optimal level of capital from the optimal level of savings (which needs not be the one
that, if held as capital, maximizes net output).24 Accordingly, Section 5, provides a policy that decentralizes the golden rule
with positive money demand.25
Nonetheless, before moving to the decentralization of the golden rule, note that Proposition 2 does not say that, without
intervention, the presence of money prevents attaining the golden rule, but rather that only if money is not demanded (even
if present in the model) at a competitive equilibrium steady state can the latter decentralize the golden rule. To make this
point clearer, Proposition 3 shows that in the absence of money the competitive steady state and the best steady state gener-
ically differ.
Proposition 3. Consider a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations production economy without money and an exogenously
growing population with a representative agent who can increase his survival probability at a real cost and can save in actuarially
fair annuities contractually contingent to such choices. Then no competitive equilibrium steady state of the economy implements
the golden rule.
23 See Footnote 17.
24 In general, without the possibility of such a separation there is no hope of attaining the golden rule, as in the original Diamond (1965) setup.
25 Alternatively, if also the return to money could be made contingent to the longevity choices, then the golden rule could be attained as a competitive
outcome without intervention but, as discussed above, the impossibility to contractually annuitize the returns to cash and bank accounts and the negligible
impact of each individual on the survival rate prevent this possibility.
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Proof. If money is removed from the model it is straightforward to see that a competitive steady state ðc0; c1; k; eÞ coincides
with the best steady state only if
n ¼ FK kn ;1
 
ð26Þ
is satisﬁed, i.e. only if the competitive steady state return to capital equals the population growth rate, but nothing in the
competitive steady state equations guarantees that this is the case. As a matter of fact, typically this will not be the case:
a competitive steady state is characterized by four variables ðc0; c1; k; eÞ satisfying the following four equations
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ ¼ FK
k
n
;1
 
c0 þ kþ e ¼ FL kn ;1
 
pðeÞ
n
c1 ¼ FK kn ;1
 
k
n
p0ðeÞvðc1Þ ¼ 1þ p
0ðeÞ
pðeÞ k
 
v 0ðc1Þn:
ð27Þ
Condition (26) will therefore not be satisﬁed by a competitive steady state, generically in the space of the fundamentals of
the economy (preferences and technology). h
Given that the competitive equilibrium steady state typically differs from the golden rule, how do they compare? Does
the market lead to over-saving or under-saving? Does it lead to over- or under-investment in life-enhancing expenditures?
As the next proposition shows, the level of capital (and hence of net output) at the golden rule and at the competitive equi-
librium steady state actually coincide since in both cases, the marginal productivity of capital is equalized to the rate of
growth of the population. However, the life-expectancy and hence the size of the population are different: at a monetary
competitive equilibrium steady state, people live either longer but poorer lives, or shorter but richer lives, than those cor-
responding to the best trade-off between ‘‘quantity’’ and ‘‘quality’’ of life.
Proposition 4. Consider a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations production economy with money and an exogenously
growing population with a representative agent who can increase his survival probability at a real cost and can save in actuarially
fair annuities contractually contingent to such choices. At every competitive equilibrium steady state ð~c0; ~c1; ~k; ~m; ~eÞ the agent
consumes either too little (in both periods) and devotes too much effort to increase his life-expectancy compared to the golden rule
ðc0; c1; k; eÞ, or consumes too much (in both periods) and devotes too little effort. More speciﬁcally,
either
c0 < ~c0
c1 < ~c1
k ¼ ~k
e > ~e
or
c0 > ~c0
c1 > ~c1
k ¼ ~k
e < ~e
ð28Þ
Proof. See Appendix A. h
The above proposition thus establishes that, in the overlapping generations setup considered here, there may be over- as
well as under-investment in longevity, even with a perfectly competitive market of annuities contingent to the individuals’
longevity-enhancing behavior.26 Whether agents under- or over-invest in their longevity at the steady state competitive equi-
librium depends on their relative preferences for consumption and longevity and thus on the concavity of the functions uðÞ; vðÞ
and pðÞ. In any case, a golden rule investment in longevity that is higher (resp. lower) than at the competitive equilibrium leads
to less (resp. more) consumption in both periods.
Having shown that, without intervention, no competitive equilibrium steady state can be the golden rule, we show, in the
following section, how to decentralize the latter as a competitive outcome under the adequate ﬁscal policy.
5. Policy implementing the golden rule steady state as a competitive equilibrium steady state
Assume the government taxes longevity-enhancing expenditures et of agents born at time t at a rate rt , while it hands the
proceeds of the tax at t þ 1 through a lump-sum transfer Tt . The problem of an agent born at t becomes
max
06ct0 ;c
t
1 ;k
t ;et ;Mt
uðct0Þ þ pðetÞvðct1Þ
s:t: ct0 þ kt þ 1pt M
t þ ð1þ rtÞet 6 wt
ct1 6 1pðetÞ rtþ1k
t þ 1ptþ1 M
t þ Tt
ð29Þ
26 Philipson and Becker (1998), as a result of addressing this issue in an essentially static setup, ﬁnd that agents always have incentives to over-invest in their
longevity.
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Note that Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee again that ct0; c
t
1; e
t > 0 but not necessarily strictly positive savings, i.e. kt > 0 or
Mt > 0 (or both, as long as the two assets have the same return), nonetheless we can focus on interior competitive equilibria
such that kt;Mt > 0. 27 The agent’s choice in such equilibria is then necessarily characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions or,
equivalently, by
1
pðetÞ
u0ðct0Þ
v 0ðct1Þ
¼ pt
ptþ1
¼ 1
pðetÞ rtþ1
ct0 þ kt þ
1
pt
Mt þ ð1þ rtÞet ¼ wt
ct1 ¼
1
pðetÞ rtþ1k
t þ 1
ptþ1
Mt þ Tt
p0ðetÞvðct1Þ ¼ ð1þ rtÞ þ
p0ðetÞ
pðetÞ k
t
 
v 0ðct1Þrtþ1
ð30Þ
At a competitive equilibrium, the conditions requiring the wage and rental rate of capital to be the marginal productiv-
ities still hold. We require also that the government runs a balanced budget at every period so that, in every period t,
rtet ¼ pðe
t1Þ
n
Tt1 ð31Þ
holds, where the amount raised by taxes on health expenditures on the left-hand side matches at every period the lump-sum
amount handed out to the survivors of the previous generation, on the right-hand side. Finally, adding up the budget
constraints of the agents alive at any given period,
ct0 þ
pðet1Þ
n
ct11 þ kt þ
1
pt
Mt þ ð1þ rtÞet ¼ FL k
t1
n
;1
 !
þ FK k
t1
n
;1
 !
kt1
n
þ pðe
t1Þ
n
1
pt
Mt1 þ pðe
t1Þ
n
Tt1 ð32Þ
It follows that the feasibility condition is again equivalent to (20) which implies (21) at the steady state.
Therefore, the competitive equilibrium steady state is characterized now by a proﬁle ðc0; c1; e; k;mÞ satisfying
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ ¼ n ¼ FK
k
n
;1
 
c0 þ kþmþ ð1þ rÞe ¼ FL kn ;1
 
c1 ¼ 1pðeÞ FK
k
n
;1
 
kþ n
pðeÞmþ T
p0ðeÞvðc1Þ ¼ ð1þ rÞ þ p
0ðeÞ
pðeÞ k
 
v 0ðc1Þn
ð33Þ
with
re ¼ pðeÞ
n
T ð34Þ
for the government budget to be balanced. Comparing these conditions with those characterizing the golden rule in (24), it is
straightforward that the golden rule is a competitive equilibrium steady state under the tax and transfer policy deﬁned
above if, and only if, the tax rate is
r ¼ p0ðeÞ c

1
n
 k

pðeÞ
 
ð35Þ
where c1; k
, and e are the golden rule values. In particular, if the golden rule second-period consumption exceeds the return
from annuities, i.e.
c1 >
n
pðeÞ k
 ¼ 1
pðeÞ FK
k
n
;1
 
k ð36Þ
then it can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium taxing ﬁrst-period longevity-enhancing expenditures and making
positive second-period transfers, and conversely in the opposite case.
The intuition is the following. Whenever the golden rule second-period consumption level exceeds the return from cap-
ital—which, from Proposition 4, is equal to the competitive equilibrium steady state level of capital—it is because the return
from annuities is too low. This means that at the competitive equilibrium steady state the agent invests too much in his
27 The same comment as in Footnote 17 applies here. Since we focus on the steady state, any steady state with kt ¼ 0 or Mt ¼ 0 is Pareto-dominated by any
interior steady state.
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longevity. The only way to reduce ~e toward e consists then in taxing longevity-enhancing expenditures. A symmetric rea-
soning applies when the golden rule consumption is smaller than the return from capital and health expenditures need to be
subsidized.
Speciﬁcally, in order to implement the golden rule, it sufﬁces to announce at the beginning of each period t (i) a
longevity-enhancing expenditure tax (or subsidy, depending on its sign) rate equal to
rt ¼ p0ðet1Þ c
t1
1
n
 k
t1
pðet1Þ
" #
ð37Þ
and (ii) a lump-sum transfer to old agents at t þ 1 of an amount28
Tt ¼ n
pðet1Þ e
t1rt : ð38Þ
Substituting these two expressions into conditions (30) characterizing now the competitive equilibrium, it is straightfor-
ward to check that, at the steady state, the government budget is balanced in every period and that the conditions coincide
with those of the golden rule in (24). Therefore, such a tax-and-transfer scheme decentralizes the golden rule. This result is
summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. Consider a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations production economy with money and an exogenously
growing population with a representative agent who can increase his survival probability at a real cost and can save in actuarially
fair annuities contractually contingent to such choices. The golden rule steady state is a competitive equilibrium outcome if each
generation t faces a tax (or a subsidy) on its longevity-enhancing expenditures, whose expression is given by Eq. (37) and receives
(or is subject to) a second-period lump-sum transfer (or tax) in t þ 1 of an amount deﬁned by Eq. (38).
In case it seems counterintuitive that taxing longevity-enhancing expenditures may ever be welfare-improving, let us
consider, in order to assess the true impact of this ﬁscal policy, the expected per capita net taxes paid by any given generation
t, i.e. st ¼ rtet  pðetÞTt . First, note that the transfer Tt is conditional on the individual’s survival, while the contribution rtet
is paid in ﬁrst period, with certainty. Second, substituting the expressions for rt and Tt , it follows that
st ¼ p0ðet1Þ ct11 
n
pðet1Þ k
t1
 
et
n
 pðe
tÞet1
pðet1Þ
 
ð39Þ
which at the steady state becomes
s ¼ p0ðeÞ c1  npðeÞ k
 
1
n
 1
 
e: ð40Þ
When population growth is positive, i.e. n > 1, the second term in brackets is negative and the net contribution is differ-
ent from zero as soon as second-period consumption differs from the return from annuities. Speciﬁcally, if the golden rule
second-period consumption exceeds the annuitized return to capital—so that the implementation of the golden rule requires
taxing health expenditures—then the expected net contribution of the representative agent is actually negative. In this case,
he pays a tax in the ﬁrst period that is more than offset (in expectation) by a second-period lump-sum transfer that is made
signiﬁcantly big thanks to the taxes paid by the next generation of a growing population. On the contrary, if the golden rule
second-period consumption is smaller than the annuitized return to capital—so that the implementation of the golden rule
requires subsidizing instead health expenditures—then the expected net contribution of the agent is actually positive, as he
receives a subsidy when young that he has to pay back through a lump-sum tax when old to subsidize the health expendi-
tures of a growing population.29 This result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6. Consider a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations production economy with money and an exogenously
growing population with a representative agent who can increase his survival probability at a real cost and can save in actuarially
fair annuities contractually contingent to such choices. When the golden rule steady state is implemented through the taxation
(resp. subsidization) of longevity-enhancing expenditures, the agents expected net contribution is actually negative (resp. positive).
Finally, since at the heart of the problem there is the ability of the planner (but not of the agents) to internalize the exter-
nality of longevity-enhancing expenditures on the return to money in Eq. (21), it may seem that a policy that manipulates
the return to money could also succeed in implementing the golden rule steady state, without having to go through a
Pigouvian tax. This is unfortunately not the case, since not only distorting the return to money is needed, but also distorting
the marginal cost of increasing longevity-enhancing expenditures, which the above Pigouvian tax achieves—through the
presence of rt in the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to et in (30). To the opposite, a distortion in the return to money
would only show up in the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Mt , with no impact on the marginal condition on et and
hence on its level.
28 Note that these expressions depend only on past variables so that they cannot be manipulated by individuals born in period t.
29 In the absence of population growth (i.e. n ¼ 1), the net contribution of the individual in the steady state is s ¼ 0.
374 J. Dávila, M.-L. Leroux / Journal of Macroeconomics 45 (2015) 363–383
6. Discussion
Before concluding, let us consider to other extensions. First, we assume that agents can inﬂuence their life-expectancy by
means of efforts that are no longer costly in terms of resources but in terms of utility. Second, we assume that agents also
have the possibility to supply labor in the second period of their life and that the amount supplied depends on the health
expenditures made in the ﬁrst period. Third, we assume that agents may live more than just two periods and consider a
model akin to a ‘‘perpetual youth model’’ à la Blanchard (1985) but with endogenous longevity. In the following, we show
how these alternative assumptions may modify the results obtained in the previous sections.
6.1. Efforts in terms of utility but not of resources
Individuals can certainly inﬂuence their life expectancy not only through health expenditures but also through behavioral
choices (such as a constraining way of life, healthy diets, no smoking, and exercising) that may not have an impact on their
budget constraints, but have nonetheless an impact on the agent’s utility. One may wonder whether our previous results still
hold and, whether something can be done about it, given that there is no use of resources (i.e. health spending) to tax now.
In essence, all our previous results carry over. Speciﬁcally, the golden rule is not a competitive equilibrium outcome, but it
can still be made to become one.
Deﬁning ce as the utility cost of longevity-enhancing behavior and c being the intensity of effort disutility, it is straight-
forward to check that the golden rule solution to
max
06c0 ;c1 ;k;e
uðc0Þ þ pðeÞvðc1Þ  ce
s:t: c0 þ pðeÞn c1 þ k 6 F kn ;1
  ð41Þ
is now characterized by
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ
¼ n ¼ FK k

n
;1
 
c0 þ
pðeÞ
n
c1 þ k ¼ F
k
n
;1
 
p0ðeÞvðc1Þ ¼ cþ p0ðeÞv 0ðc1Þc1
ð42Þ
It is easy to check that it is not a competitive equilibrium steady state using the same arguments as before.30 Its decentral-
ization is nevertheless less straightforward, since the standard Pigouvian tax which was used in the simple case of health expen-
diture does not work here. Indeed, the healthy behaviors we consider in this setting do not translate into expenditures that enter
the agents’ budget constraints and that could be taxed directly. Moreover, taxing them indirectly, by taxing, for example, saving
returns (held in either capital or money) in order to worsen the prospect of a high life-expectancy, would at the same time distort
the consumption-savingdecision,making it impossible to attain thegolden rule.31 Therefore, an alternative intervention isneeded.
Consider instead the following policy. Announce to the agent born at t that, in the second period t þ 1, a lump-sum tax or
subsidy of an amount Tt ¼ 1pt M
t1 ln pðe
t Þ
pðet1Þ will be raised from or transferred to him, depending on its sign. Note that while
Mt1 and pðet1Þ—the survival rate at t—are known at time t, the effort et in the survival probability pðetÞ of an agent born
at time t is not known at the time the announcement is made. Nonetheless, it will be known by the government at the time
the policy is implemented in t þ 1. This tax can thus be manipulated by the individual, so that choosing a given level of effort
in t inﬂuences the level of tax or subsidy he faces in period t þ 1.
The representative agent’s problem then becomes
max
06ct
0
;ct
1
;kt1 ;e
t ;Mt
uðct0Þ þ pðetÞvðct1Þ  cet
s:t: ct0 þ kt þ 1pt M
t 6 wt
ct1 6 1pðetÞ rtþ1k
t þ 1ptþ1 M
t  1pt M
t1 ln pðe
t Þ
pðet1Þ
ð43Þ
and it is not difﬁcult to check that the resulting competitive equilibrium steady state equations are exactly those of the
golden rule in (42).
30 The competitive equilibrium steady state condition for effort is in this case
p0ð~eÞvð~c1Þ ¼ cþ p
0ð~eÞ
pð~eÞ v
0ð~c1Þ~kn:
31 This works instead in a static partial equilibrium framework, as in Leroux (2011), where the best allocation is restored through a tax on savings or,
equivalently, on second-period consumption. In this case, the individual has less incentives to invest in a higher life expectancy as his second-period
consumption is lower.
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Note that the value of Tt ¼ 1pt M
t1 ln pðe
t Þ
pðet1Þ is zero at the steady state, so that no tax or subsidy is actually raised or handed
out when the golden rule is implemented, keeping the government budget trivially balanced. As a matter of fact, the mere
announcement of such a policy makes the agents modify their choices in such a way that the golden rule is attained in a
decentralized way. Individuals are then given the opportunity to manipulate the tax or the subsidy in their interest and,
in order to do that, they will change their behavior. Interestingly enough, it turns out that, trying to manipulate the tax,
it is actually them who are manipulated to implement the golden rule.
6.2. Extension to second period endogenous labor supply
It is worth noticing that on top of the effect of health expenditures on the agents’ survival probability, the model can
easily be extended so that health expenditures also have a direct productivity effect along the lines of Grossman (1972).
It sufﬁces to assume that agents work in both periods, supplying inelastically one unit of labor when young (as before), while
supplying an amount of labor when old that effectively depends on their ﬁrst-period health expenditures.
Speciﬁcally, the agent born at time t now solves
max
06ct0 ;c
t
1 ;k
t ;Mt ;et
uðct0Þ þ pðetÞvðct1Þ
ct0 þ kt þ 1pt M
t þ et 6 wt
ct1 6 1pðetÞ rtþ1k
t þ 1ptþ1 M
t þwtþ1lðetÞ
ð44Þ
where lðetÞ in the second budget constraint is his second period labor supply, satisfying lðetÞ 2 ½0;1; l00ðetÞ < 0 < l0ðetÞ for all
et > 0; limet!0þ l
0ðetÞ ¼ þ1, and limet!þ1 lðetÞ ¼ 1. 32
Accordingly, ﬁrms employ at equilibrium an amount of labor equal to 1þ pðetÞn lðetÞ to produce at t þ 1, so that factors are
remunerated at rates
wt ¼ FL k
t1
n
;1þ pðe
t1Þ
n
lðet1Þ
 !
rtþ1 ¼ FK k
t
n
;1þ pðe
tÞ
n
lðetÞ
 ! ð45Þ
The agent’s choice in such equilibria is then necessarily characterized by
1
pðetÞ
u0ðct0Þ
v 0ðct1Þ
¼ pt
ptþ1
¼ 1
pðetÞ rtþ1
ct0 þ kt þ
1
pt
Mt þ et ¼ wt
ct1 ¼
1
pðetÞ rtþ1k
t þ 1
ptþ1
Mt þwtþ1lðetÞ
p0ðetÞvðct1Þ ¼ 1þ
p0ðetÞ
pðetÞ k
t
 
v 0ðct1Þrtþ1  pðetÞwtþ1l0ðetÞv 0ðct1Þ:
ð46Þ
Only the third and fourth lines—the second period budget constraint and the optimality condition for e, respectively—dif-
fer from those of the case without second period labor supply. In the fourth line, pðetÞwtþ1l0ðetÞv 0ðct1Þ represents the marginal
second-period utility beneﬁt of an increased labor supply, through the increase of health expenditure.
The feasibility of the allocation is still equivalent to Eq. (20)—i.e. (21) at the steady state—so that a monetary competitive
equilibrium steady state consists of a proﬁle satisfying
u0ð~c0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ ¼ n ¼ FK
~k
n
;1þ pð~eÞ
n
lð~eÞ
 !
~c0 þ ~kþ ~mþ ~e ¼ FL
~k
n
;1þ pð~eÞ
n
lð~eÞ
 !
pð~eÞ
n
c1 ¼ FK
~k
n
;1þ pð~eÞ
n
lð~eÞ
 !
~k
n
þ ~mþ FL
~k
n
;1þ pð~eÞ
n
lð~eÞ
 !
pð~eÞlð~eÞ
n
p0ð~eÞvð~c1Þ ¼ 1þ p
0ð~eÞ
pð~eÞ
~k FL
~k
n
;1þ pð~eÞ
n
lð~eÞ
 !
pð~eÞ
n
l0ð~eÞ
" #
v 0ð~c1Þn
ð47Þ
32 Note that second period work duration cannot exceed second period life duration, i.e. lðetÞ 6 1. As before (see Footnote 19), the constrained set is not
guaranteed to be convex but, as in the previous case, the necessity of the FOC’s sufﬁces to establish the main result, namely that the planner’s steady state is not
a laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state.
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Note that, in comparison to the competitive equilibrium steady state with no second period labor supply (see Eq. (20)),
there is an additional term within the brackets on the right-hand side of the last equation. This term directly follows from the
endogeneity of second-period labor supply: a marginal increase in health expenditures et in the ﬁrst period now leads to a
marginal increase in second-period income through increased labor supply.
On the other hand, the golden rule is again characterized by the unique solution to the problem maximizing the steady
state expected utility of the representative agent under the feasibility constraint (written next in per young terms)
max
06c0 ;c1 ;k;e
uðc0Þ þ pðeÞvðc1Þ
s:t: c0 þ pðeÞn c1 þ kþ e 6 F kn ;1þ pðeÞn lðeÞ
 	 ð48Þ
The solution to this problem is characterized by the equations33
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ
¼ n ¼ FK k

n
;1þ pðe
Þ
n
lðeÞ
 
c0 þ
pðeÞ
n
c1 þ k þ e ¼ F
k
n
;1þ pðe
Þ
n
lðeÞ
 
p0ðeÞvðc1Þ ¼ 1þ
p0ðeÞ
n
c1  FL
k
n
;1þ pðe
Þ
n
lðeÞ
 
pðeÞ
n
l0ðeÞ þ p
0ðeÞ
n
lðeÞ
  
v 0ðc1Þn
ð49Þ
Let us compare the competitive equilibrium steady state deﬁned by (47) and the golden rule deﬁned by (49) under
endogenous second-period labor supply with our baseline case where second-period labor supply was nil. Under endoge-
nous labor supply, we still obtain that the competitive equilibrium steady state and the golden rule levels of e differ since
the factor ~kpð~eÞ within brackets in the competitive equilibrium steady state equations is now replaced by
c1
n in the golden rule
equations. However, unlike the zero second-period labor supply case, there is now at the golden rule, a term,
FL k

n ;1þ pðe
Þ
n lðeÞ
 	
p0ðeÞlðeÞv 0ðc1Þ, which is absent from the competitive equilibrium equation. This is a direct consequence
from the fact that, at the competitive equilibrium, the agent does not take into account the impact of the increase in survival
(equivalently the increase in number of survivors) on the return from labor.
Like in the case with no second-period labor supply, the tax-and-transfer scheme described in Section 5 allows to decen-
tralize the golden rule as a competitive equilibrium (only the rates would differ). The agent’s choice in such equilibria is then
necessarily characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions or, equivalently, by
1
pðetÞ
u0ðct0Þ
v 0ðct1Þ
¼ pt
ptþ1
¼ 1
pðetÞ rtþ1
ct0 þ kt þ
1
pt
Mt þ ð1þ rtÞet ¼ wt
ct1 ¼ wtþ1lðetÞ þ
1
pðetÞ rtþ1k
t þ 1
ptþ1
Mt þ Tt
p0ðetÞvðct1Þ ¼ ð1þ rtÞ þ
p0ðetÞ
pðetÞ k
t
 
v 0ðct1Þrtþ1 wtþ1pðetÞl0ðetÞv 0ðct1Þ
ð50Þ
In equilibrium, the wage and the rental rate of capital are still equal to marginal productivities. The government must also
run a balanced budget at every period so that, in every period t, Eq. (31) still holds. Finally, the budget constraints of the
agents alive at any given period, still imply the feasibility condition to be equal to (20), and hence (21) at the steady state.
Therefore, the competitive equilibrium steady state is now characterized by a proﬁle satisfying
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ ¼ n ¼ FK
k
n
;1þ pðeÞ
n
lðeÞ
 
c0 þ kþmþ ð1þ rÞe ¼ FL kn ;1þ
pðeÞ
n
lðeÞ
 
c1 ¼ FL kn ;1þ
pðeÞ
n
lðeÞ
 
lðeÞ þ 1
pðeÞ FK
k
n
;1þ pðeÞ
n
lðeÞ
 
kþ n
pðeÞmþ T
p0ðeÞvðc1Þ ¼ ð1þ rÞ þ p
0ðeÞ
pðeÞ k FL
k
n
;1þ pðeÞ
n
lðeÞ
 
pðeÞl0ðeÞ
 
v 0ðc1Þn
ð51Þ
33 As in the case with no second-period labor supply, the planner’s problem is not convex (see Footnote 22). Nonetheless, the generic regularity of any solution
to any system along an homotopy between the system (49) above with second period labor supply and the system without it in (24)—along with the
uniqueness of the solution to the system in the latter case—guarantees the characterization of the planner’s choice by Eqs. (49) above (see Proposition A3 in the
appendix).
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with
re ¼ pðeÞ
n
T: ð52Þ
Comparing these conditions with those characterizing the golden rule in (49), it follows that the golden rule is a compet-
itive equilibrium steady state under the tax-and-transfer policy described above if, and only if, the tax rate is equal to
r ¼ p0ðeÞ c

1
n
 k

pðeÞ
 
 FL k

n
;1þ pðe
Þ
n
lðeÞ
 
p0ðeÞ
n
lðeÞ ð53Þ
where c1; k
, and e are the golden rule values. In particular, if the golden rule second-period consumption exceeds
second-period income from savings in capital and from labor—i.e. the return from annuities plus second-period labor
income—it can then be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium taxing ﬁrst-period longevity-enhancing expenditures
and making second-period transfers, and conversely in the opposite case.
Note ﬁnally that the level of r is here distorted downward as compared to our initial framework (Eq. (35)) since the sec-
ond term on the right-hand side of (53) is negative. The tax rate is thus smaller because of the positive impact of the increase
in the number of the survivors on the marginal productivity of labor (and thus, on the real wage).
6.3. A ‘‘perpetual youth’’ model with endogenous and varying survival probability
We ﬁnally consider an extension of the model that allows agents to survive a priori any number of periods, in the spirit of
Blanchard (1985), but with an endogenous survival probability that depends on some health expenditures. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that agents face at every period a survival probability pðet1Þ that depends on the health expenditures they made in
the previous period, et1.
An agent born at t solves, therefore,
max
ct
j
;ktj ;m
t
j
;et
j
Xþ1
j¼0
b jpðetj1Þuðctj Þ
s:t: ctj þ ktj þmtj þ etj 6 wtþj þ
rtþj
pðet
j1Þ
ktj1 þmtj1
ptþj1
ptþj
8j ¼ 0;1 . . .
ð54Þ
where t stands for the birth date of the agent and j ¼ 0;1; . . . for his age (so the ctj stands for the consumption at t þ j of an
agent born at t) with pðet1Þ ¼ 1 and kt1 ¼ 0 ¼ mt1 trivially. The parameter b is the discount factor of the agent. The solution
to the problem faced by an agent born at t is then characterized by the following ﬁrst order conditions (with respect to
ctj ; k
t
j ;m
t
j ; e
t
j )
b jpðetj1Þu0ðctj Þ
0
0
bjþ1p0ðetj Þuðctjþ1Þ
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA ¼ ktj
1
1
1
1
0
BBB@
1
CCCAþ ktjþ1
0
 1pðet
j
Þ rtþjþ1
 ptþjptþjþ1
p0ðet
j
Þ
pðet
j
Þ2 rtþjþ1k
t
j
0
BBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCA
ð55Þ
for all j ¼ 0;1; . . ., where ktj and ktjþ1 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraints at ages j and jþ 1,
along with the budget constraints themselves binding. Rearranging these terms, we obtain the following condition on effort:
p0ðetj Þuðctjþ1Þ ¼ 1þ
p0ðetj Þ
pðetj Þ
ktj
" #
u0ðctjþ1Þrtþjþ1 ð56Þ
for all t integer and j ¼ 0;1; . . . with
rt ¼ FK KtNt ;
Lt
Nt
 
ð57Þ
where factors are expressed in per 0-year old agents,34 and
Lt
Nt
¼
Xþ1
j¼0
1
nj
Yj
h¼0
pðetjh1Þ
" #
Kt
Nt
¼
Xþ1
j¼0
1
nj
Yj
h¼0
pðetj1h1 Þ
ktj1j
n
" # ð58Þ
34 Output is linearly homogeneous, so that marginal productivities are homogeneous of degree 0.
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for all integer t, where Nt ¼ nNt1 and N0 ¼ 1. As in the setup considered in the rest of the paper, condition (56)
requires that the return to an increase in the longevity-enhancing expenditures, at any age j ¼ 0;1; . . . for any gener-
ation t, matches exactly the direct and indirect costs of doing so. More speciﬁcally, at a competitive equilibrium steady
state,
p0ðejÞuðcjþ1Þ ¼ 1þ p
0ðejÞ
pðejÞ kj
 
u0ðcjþ1Þr ð59Þ
must hold for all j ¼ 0;1; . . . with
r ¼ FK KtNt ;
Lt
Nt
 
; ð60Þ
and
Lt
Nt
¼
Xþ1
j¼0
1
nj
Yj
h¼0
pðeh1Þ
" #
Kt
Nt
¼
Xþ1
j¼0
1
nj
Yj
h¼0
pðeh1Þ kjn
" #
:
ð61Þ
At the steady state, Kt and Lt grow at the same rate as Nt , i.e. by the same factor n each period, while the per 0-year old capital
and labor, Kt=Nt and Lt=Nt respectively stay constant at the levels in (61).
A planner, on the contrary, solves the following problem for the representative agent at the steady state
max
cj ;kj ;ej
Xþ1
j¼0
b jpðej1ÞuðcjÞ
s:t:
Xþ1
j¼0
Q j
h¼0 pðeh1Þ
n j cj þ kj þ ej

 
6 F
Xþ1
j¼0
Q j
h¼0 pðeh1Þ
n j
kj
n ;
Q j
h¼0 pðeh1Þ
n j
 ! ð62Þ
with pðe1Þ ¼ 1. First-order conditions with respect to cj; kj; ej of this problem are
b jpðej1Þu0ðcjÞ
0
bjþ1p0ðejÞuðcjþ1Þ
0
B@
1
CA ¼ k
1
n j
Yj
h¼0
pðeh1Þ
1
n j
Yj
h¼0
pðeh1Þ 1 1n FK
 
1
n j
Yj
h¼0
pðeh1Þ þ
Xþ1
l¼jþ1
1
nl
Yl
h¼0
pðeh1Þ cl þ kl þ el  FK  kl1n  FL
h i !
p0 ðejÞ
pðejÞ
0
BBBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCCA
ð63Þ
for all j ¼ 0;1; . . . and some Lagrange multiplier k > 0. This yields the following rearranged necessary condition for effort ej at
each age j
p0ðejÞuðcjþ1Þ ¼ 1þ
Xþ1
l¼jþ1
1
nlj
Yl
h¼jþ1
pðeh1Þ cl þ kl þ el  FK  kl1n  FL
  !
p0ðejÞ
pðejÞ
" #
u0ðcjþ1ÞFK : ð64Þ
Note that, in the two-period case (i.e. when pðe1Þ ¼ 0 for any e1), necessarily kj ¼ ej ¼ 0 for all jP 1 and this necessary con-
dition becomes
p0ðe0Þuðc1Þ ¼ 1þ p
0ðe0Þ
n
c1
 
u0ðc1Þn: ð65Þ
This is equivalent to the last line in (24) which describes the golden rule condition for health expenditure (where v in (24)
stands for bu).
From conditions (59) and (64), it follows that actuarially fair annuities alone cannot implement the planner’s steady state.
The reason is that the agents fail to internalize the impact on marginal return to money of the longevity-enhancing expen-
ditures at all possible ages they may attain. The results obtained in the two-period set up then carry over to this extended
perpetual youth model.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper addresses the question of whether an actuarially fair annuity market, which makes the return of annuities
contingent to longevity-enhancing choices, is able to cope with the agents’ incentives to extend their lives inefﬁciently
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beyond optimal levels, once insured against the risk of outliving their savings. Davies and Kuhn (1992) and Philipson and
Becker (1998) addressed a related question by showing, in a static set-up, that public pension systems, by insuring indi-
viduals against the risk of running out of income, lead them to invest too much in their longevity. The reason was that
agents, having access to annuity contracts that are not contingent on their behavior, do not take into account that
increased longevity will, in the aggregate, decrease the return of their own annuities. As a consequence, individuals actu-
ally evaluate incorrectly the trade-off between ‘‘quantity’’ and ‘‘quality’’ of life. The fact that public pensions are not con-
tingent to the individuals’ choices clearly prevents them to price-in this externality. Private annuity markets instead
should in principle be—by making annuities contingent to the agents’ longevity choices—better able to restore the right
incentives. Nevertheless, we showed here in an overlapping generations production economy à la Diamond (1965) with
money and an actuarially fair competitive annuity market, that the competitive equilibrium steady state still differs from
the best possible steady state, the golden rule steady state. However, we also showed that when population growth is
positive, the golden rule steady state can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium by means of a tax-and-transfer
policy that is balanced at the steady state.
We also derived the model under alternative assumptions such as assuming second-period endogenous labor supply, a
health investment which is costly in terms of utility but not in terms of resources, and a more than two periods model.
We showed that given the nature of the mechanism driving the results in our baseline case, the results of these extended
setups did not differ greatly from those delivered by our stripped down model.
Of course, our model relies on other simplifying assumptions. One of these is the representative agent assumption.
Allowing for different types may create moral hazard problems and the intervention of the government may certainly be
complicated by the necessity to introduce incentive constraints. Such an extension has been dealt with in Leroux (2011)
when agents have different disutility of effort and in Leroux et al. (2011), when agents differ in productivity and in their
genetic backgrounds. These models are derived in a static equilibrium framework. Introducing differences in agents’ char-
acteristics affecting longevity in an overlapping generations model would certainly be interesting and is on our research
agenda.
Appendix A
Proposition A1. Consider a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations production economy with money and an exogenously
growing population with a representative agent facing an exogenous probability of survival, and saving in actuarially fair annuities.
The golden rule is well deﬁned as the unique steady state maximizing the representative agent’s utility under the feasibility
constraint.
Proof. Assume both ðc0; c1; kÞ and ðc00; c01; k0Þ satisfy the equations in (16) characterizing any solution to the problem (15), so
that
F
k
n
;1
 
¼ n ¼ F k
0
n
;1
 
ð66Þ
from which k ¼ k ¼ k0 for some k, and
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ ¼ n ¼
u0ðc00Þ
v 0ðc01Þ
ð67Þ
c0 þ pn c1 ¼ F
k
n
;1
 
 k ¼ c00 þ
p
n
c01 ð68Þ
Assume without loss of generality that c0 < c00. Since u
00;v 00 < 0, the ﬁrst line above implies that c1 < c01 as well. There is a
contradiction with the second line. Hence c0 ¼ c00 and therefore c1 ¼ c01 as well. h
Proposition A2. In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations production economy with a representative agent who can increase
his life expectancy at a cost in terms of resources, the golden rule is well deﬁned as the unique steady state maximizing the rep-
resentative agent’s utility under the feasibility constraint.
Proof. Assume both ðc0; c1; k; eÞ and ðc00; c01; k0; e0Þ satisfy Eqs. (24) characterizing any solution to the problem (23), so that
F
k
n
;1
 
¼ n ¼ F k
0
n
;1
 
ð69Þ
from which k ¼ k ¼ k0 for some k, and
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u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ ¼ n ¼
u0ðc00Þ
v 0ðc01Þ
ð70Þ
c0 þ pðeÞn c1 þ e ¼ F
k
n
;1
 
 k ¼ c00 þ
pðe0Þ
n
c01 þ e0 ð71Þ
Assume without loss of generality that c0 < c00. Since u
00;v 00 < 0, the ﬁrst line above implies that c1 < c01 as well. Hence
from the second line, e > e0 since p0 > 0. But the last line of (24) requires
p0ðeÞvðc1Þ  v
0ðc1Þc1
v 0ðc1Þ ¼ n ð72Þ
to be satisﬁed by both ðe; c1Þ and ðe0; c01Þ. This cannot be since, on the left-hand side, the function ðvðcÞ  v 0ðcÞcÞ=v 0ðcÞ is
strictly increasing in c (as v 00 < 0), and p0ðeÞ is decreasing in e (as p00 < 0). Hence c0 ¼ c00. Similarly, c1 ¼ c01, and hence
e ¼ e0 also, since the left-hand side of the feasibility condition in (16) is monotone in e. h
Proof of Proposition 4. Firstly, ~k ¼ k follows trivially from (14) and (16):
FK
~k
n
;1
 !
¼ n ¼ FK k

n
;1
 
: ð73Þ
(1) Assume e > ~e and c1 P ~c1. Then
pðeÞ
n
c1 >
pð~eÞ
n
~c1 ð74Þ
and hence c0 < ~c0 from the feasibility condition
c0 þ
pðeÞ
n
c1 þ e ¼ F
k
n
;1
 
 k ¼ F
~k
n
;1
 !
 ~k ¼ ~c0 þ pð
~eÞ
n
~c1 þ ~e ð75Þ
so that
u0ðc0Þ > u0ð~c0Þ: ð76Þ
Moreover, since c1 P ~c1, then
1
v 0ðc1Þ
P
1
v 0ð~c1Þ : ð77Þ
Therefore,
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ
P
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ >
u0ð~c0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ ð78Þ
which cannot be since at the competitive equilibrium steady state and at the golden rule steady state, the marginal
rates of substitution are both equal to the rate of growth of the population, n.
Therefore, either e 6 ~e or c1 < ~c1 or both hold.
(2) Assume that both e 6 ~e and c1 < ~c1 hold. Then
pðeÞ
n
c1 <
pð~eÞ
n
~c1 ð79Þ
and hence c0 > ~c0 again by the feasibility condition, from which
u0ðc0Þ < u0ð~c0Þ: ð80Þ
Moreover, since c1 < ~c1, then
1
v 0ðc1Þ
<
1
v 0ð~c1Þ : ð81Þ
Therefore,
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ
<
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ <
u0ð~c0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ ð82Þ
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which again cannot be since both the LHS and the RHS are equal to n.
Therefore, either e 6 ~e and c1 P ~c1, or e > ~e and c1 < ~c1.
Now let us see that e 6 ~e and c1 P ~c1 can only hold with both inequalities being strict.
(3) Assume that e ¼ ~e and c1 > ~c1. Then
pðeÞ
n
c1 >
pð~eÞ
n
~c1 ð83Þ
and hence c0 < ~c0 by the feasibility condition, from which
u0ðc0Þ > u0ð~c0Þ: ð84Þ
Moreover, since c1 > ~c1, then
1
v 0ðc1Þ
>
1
v 0ð~c1Þ : ð85Þ
Therefore,
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ
>
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ >
u0ð~c0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ ð86Þ
which again cannot be since both at the competitive equilibrium steady state and the golden rule steady state, these
marginal rates of substitution are equal to the growth factor of the population n.
(4) Assume that e < ~e and c1 ¼ ~c1. Then
pðeÞ
n
c1 <
pð~eÞ
n
~c1 ð87Þ
and hence c0 > ~c0 by the feasibility condition, from which
u0ðc0Þ < u0ð~c0Þ: ð88Þ
Moreover, since c1 ¼ ~c1, then
1
v 0ðc1Þ
¼ 1v 0ð~c1Þ : ð89Þ
Therefore,
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ
¼ u
0ðc0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ <
u0ð~c0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ ð90Þ
which again cannot be since both the LHS and the RHS are equal to the growth factor of the population n.
(5) Assume e ¼ ~e and c1 ¼ ~c1. Then
pðeÞ
n
c1 ¼
pð~eÞ
n
~c1 ð91Þ
and hence c0 ¼ ~c0, i.e. ðc0; c1; eÞ ¼ ð~c0; ~c1; ~eÞ which cannot be by Proposition 2.
Therefore, either e > ~e and c1 < ~c1, or e
 < ~e and c1 > ~c1.
(6) Finally, since both at the golden rule steady state and the competitive equilibrium steady state, it holds
u0ðc0Þ
v 0ðc1Þ
¼ n ¼ u
0ð~c0Þ
v 0ð~c1Þ ð92Þ
either e < ~e; c1 > ~c1 and c

0 > ~c0, or e
 > ~e; c1 < ~c1 and c

0 < ~c0. h
Proposition A3. The planner’s steady state in the second period labor supply case is generically—in the C1-uniform convergence
topology for u;v ;p; l—characterized as the unique solution to the system (49).
Proof. The planer’s steady state equations in (49) for the second-period labor supply case can be rewritten as follows (where
obvious arguments have been dropped for the sake of readability)
u0  nv 0 ¼ 0
FK  n ¼ 0
c0 þ pn c1 þ kþ e F ¼ 0
p0v  1þ p
0
n
c1
 
v 0nþ FL l0pþ lp0

 
v 0 ¼ 0
ð94Þ
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whose Jacobian of the left-hand side is
u00 nv 00 0 0
0 0 FKK 1n FKLA
1
n
1  pn 0 1þ p
0
n c1

 
n FLA
 
1
n
0  1þ p0n c1

 
n FLA
 
v 00 FLK 1n Av
0 p00½v  v 0c1 þ FLLA2v 0 þ FLBv 0
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA ð95Þ
where A ¼ l0pþ lp0 and B ¼ l00pþ 2l0p0 þ lp00.
Note that the planer’s steady state equations do not depend on second derivatives of u;v ;p; l so that, should the Jacobian
at a solution to the system be singular, there exists an arbitrarily close35 economy differing from the given one just in the
second order derivatives of some of these functions (but not in their values or ﬁrst order derivatives, so that the solution still
satisﬁes the system) such that the Jacobian is regular. In other words, the solution is generically—in the C1-uniform topology—a
regular zero of the system, i.e. locally unique.
Since it is moreover globally unique when l0ðeÞ ¼ 0 for all e, then it is globally unique as well for any lðeÞ as long as it stays
locally unique along the following homotopy parametrized by a 2 ½0;1
u0ðc0Þ  nv 0ðc1Þ ¼ 0
FK
k
n
;1þ pðeÞ
n
½alðeÞ þ ð1 aÞl0ðeÞ
 
 n ¼ 0
c0 þ pðeÞn c1 þ kþ e F
k
n
;1þ pðeÞ
n
½alðeÞ þ ð1 aÞl0ðeÞ
 
¼ 0
p0ðeÞvðc1Þ  1þ p
0ðeÞ
n
c1
 
v 0ðc1Þnþ FL kn ;1þ
pðeÞ
n
½alðeÞ þ ð1 aÞl0ðeÞ
 
 ½al0ðeÞ þ ð1 aÞl00ðeÞpðeÞ þ ½alðeÞ þ ð1 aÞl0ðeÞp0ðeÞ

 
v 0ðc1Þ ¼ 0
ð96Þ
connecting continuously the system with second period labor lðeÞ for a ¼ 1 to the system (24) without second period labor,
i.e. l0ðeÞ ¼ 0 for all e, for a ¼ 0. Note that indeed the solution stays locally unique as a runs ½0;1 since, for all a, the Jacobian is
generically regular for the same reason as above. h
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